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English-speaking white South Africans have a curiously 
diffuse image in our society. South Africans enjoy stereotyping 
and classifying each other, but the English-speaking whites are 
seldom successfully labelled. Barroom, cocktail party, boardroom 
and even academic conversations about other South Africans fairly 
readily yield categorical descriptions of "typical" Afrikaners, 
coloured people, Zulus, Indians and the like, with or without 
insulting or flattering references. The "English", however have 
suffered or enjoyed little more than references to sun-sensitive 
skins (rooinekke or rednecks) or perhaps very cautious allusions 
to characteristic politeness to the point of hypocrisy or faintly 
suspect patriotism.
The reason for this is simply that the English-speaking 
whites include the widest spectrum of social, economic and political 
types imaginable in South Africa. Most leading businessmen are 
English-speaking, but then, as I discovered when I was once a 
social worker, so are most of the socially visible white tramps in 
the cities. English-speakers belong to a dozen or more religious 
denominations, have political views from far-right to far-left, 
seem to play all kinds of sport, and, what is more, frequently 
speak their home-language with an accent which makes everyone else 
think that they must be Afrikaans.
Over the past two to three decades, however, comment in 
the mass media has frequently raised one question about English- 
speaking whites which cannot simply be answered by.referring to 
their variety or heterogeneity. Why, it is frequently asked, 
are English-speaking whites not more visible in political life?
Why do they let Afrikaners run the country? Are English-speaking
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whites so captivated by material concerns that they abdicate their 
civic responsibilities?
These questions are oversimple, indeed illegitimate.
The questions themselves assume some kind of group response in 
politics which need not occur. Ethnic interests are by no means 
the only basis for political behaviour. Furthermore, in ethnic 
terms, the English are a minority among voters in South Africa and 
if the Afrikaners remain more or less ethnically organised then 
the English-speakers are at an obvious and permanent disadvantage.
These types of questions can lead to interesting avenues 
of exploration, however, and the remainder of this essay will be 
devoted to exploring the political role of the English-speakers in 
our changing politics.
POLITICAL TYPES AMONG ENGLISH-SPEAKERS
As a basis for discussion later in this essay, some
attempt to identify the range of political types among English-speakers 
is necessary. The typology below is based partly on numerous 
attitude surveys conducted under the auspices of the Centre for Applied 
Social Sciences at the University of Natal over the past decade, and 
partly on observation of fellow South Africans in political situations. 
In the schema below the political types are presented from left to 
right on the political spectrum. In reality the types blend into one 
another but here they are presented discretely for the sake of 
illustration. Furthermore, many individuals are not easily typified, 
having made up their own minds independent of peer group influences
and hence do not fit the scheme.
ENGLISH-SPEAKING POLITICAL TYPES
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
University-based "Radicals", critical of capitalism and the state.
Fervent liberals, critical of all conservative establishments, 
including the business establishment.
Social liberals, emphasising modern cosmopolitanism and critical 
of the government and Afrikaner establishment for opposing it.
Not hostile to capitalism - in fact tending to be rather affluent 
themselves.
Pragmatic reformers, who see abundent evidence of the need for 
change in order to promote both stability and social justice. Often
regarded as liberals by conservatives and as conservatives by 
radicals and liberals.
Apolitical types, a range of positions characterised by material 
interests, status and life-style concerns, religious commitments 
or recreational interests. Tend to be more or less critical of 
the governing establishment depending on whether or not their 
interests are interfered with. Essentially floating voters.
Younger people in the "swinging set" tend to be hostile to the 
governing establishment because of things 1 ike censorship, 
prohibition on Sunday entertainment, etc.
Conservative realists, including many but not all in the business 
community. Not centrally concerned with reform or social justice, 
but willing to change established practices if situations or the 
economy require it. Critical of government inflexibility but 
not generally hostile to the government establishment.
Conservatives, find the established state of affairs entirely to 
their liking, but tend to be suspicious of the tendency among 
Afrikaans nationalists to become ideological and to devise 
political blueprints. They tend to be largely concerned with 
practical concerns connected with their privileges as whites.
Anglo Saxon Chauvinists. A dwindling group of older people mainly 
in Natal and the Eastern Cape who probably dislike Afrikaners as 
much as they dislike foreigners, Jews and "non-whites". Rather 
colonial in attitude, they are the only group which would refer 
back to the glories of Britain in a past era.
IX. Defensive, rigid conservatives. Less affluent English-
speaking whites who feel their position threatened by upwardly 
mobile blacks and brown people, hence openly hostile to 
change. Attracted by right-wing opposition parties but feel 
socially alien in them because of their dominantly Afrikaans 
flavour.
X. Authoritarian, tough-minded racists. A loose assemblage of 
people who are actively hostile to blacks and to liberals, 
reformers and radicals. They tend to glorify old Rhodesia 
and believe in an active programme to promote white interests 
at all costs. More extreme members like to carry guns and 
adopt a life-style signifying a kind of colonial toughness.
********************
These are the main orientations to be encountered among 
core English-speaking whites. We must add to this range certain 
orientations among groups marginal to the English-speaking group 
who are nevertheless associated with it in the South African 
context. Hence we find:
- people from mixed English and Afrikaans-speaking backgrounds 
who unlike most do not become one or the other but preserve 
a dual identity. In attitude surveys we have found their 
orientations to be more conservative than those of the 
"average" English-speaking white;
- non English-speaking immigrants whose children will become 
English-speaking South Africans (Portuguese, Germans, some 
Dutch, Italians, Greeks, etc.). Once again attitude surveys 
suggest that they are typically more conservative than the 
average English-speaking South African, and indeed this is 
the common view held of them.
This rough typology of English-speakers is presented 
simply to demonstrate the range and variety of political outlooks 
and to show how difficult it is to typify the English-speaking white.
THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING WHITE AND PARTY POLITICAL CHOICE
English-speaking whites are normally associated with 
white opposition politics, at least since 1948. Before that, 
of course, they together with non Nationalist Afrikaners in the 
old United Party had enjoyed the status of being the governing 
political establishment. The shock of exclusion from political 
influence in 1948 was very great, and it was felt particularly by 
those who returned from active service in the second world war. 
Opposition sentiments were intense for a few years after 1948, with 
ex-servicemen forming the Torch Commando to mobilise against what 
they saw as sectional Afrikaans dominance. The Torch Commando 
grew to a strength of some quarter of a million members, and in 1953 
supported a stand against the Nationalist Party government by Natal, 
with the possibility of secession.
Since then much of the intensity of opposition has abated 
and political views are generally more calmly held in the ranks of 
English-speaking opposition supporters.
In the 1956 general election a tendency in English-speaking 
political behaviour emerged which has subsequently reappeared. The 
1966 election followed the Rhodesian UDI and Britain's imposition of 
sanctions, the granting of independence to a number of black states 
to the North and a period of violence and sabotage by underground 
black formations like Umkonto we Siziwe and Poqo up to 1964. It 
was also a period when world opinion became increasingly critical 
of South African policies. In the election campaign the National 
Party wooed English-speaking voters vigorously.
Outside pressure and racial anxieties, couplied with 
accommodating gestures by the National Party swung a good proportion 
of the English-speaking voters over to support for the government.
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A degree of white solidarity emerged for the first time since the 
middle to late forties.
More recently comparable representative nation-wide polls by 
the organisation Market and Opinion Surveys (Pty) Ltd., published 
inter-alia in Rapport, as well as similar polls by the Centre for 
Applied Social Sciences reveal elements of the same pattern.
In 1970 English-speaking support for the National Party 
was estimated at 21 percent of the English voter group. By mid 1972, 
this figure had dropped to some 11 percent, due probably to earlier 
"exposes" of the Broederbond in the English press and to numerous 
accusations of English disloyalty in parliament.
By late 1973, after a wave of black strikes and unrest at 
black universities the National Party support among English-speakers 
climbed to some 16 percent. The June 1976 riots in Soweto and other 
black townships, strongly critical policies by the Carter Administration 
and the call by the United Nations Security Council for arms sanctions 
against South Africa raised the proportion of support for the National 
Party to an all-time high of over 30 percent.
By 1979 this proportion dropped back to 20 percent under 
the impact of the "Information Scandal" and Prime Minister John Vorster's 
resignation. However, Zimbabwean independence in early 1980, and 
the escalation of border conflict seemed to stimulate a resurgence of 
English support for the National Party, to a proportion of some 27 
percent in mid 1980.
Disunity in the National Party seemed to cause the level of 
English support to drop in 1981 and 1982 to 20 percent. Now, however, 
with strong attacks on the National Party from the right it has risen 
again to nearly 30 percent. ^
1) The latest poll by Market and Opinion Surveys in July 1983 puts 
the proportion of English-speaking voters supporting the National 
Party at 28 percent.
Hence it seems that up to nearly one-third of English- 
speaking voters tend to float towards and away from the government.
The greater the pressures on South Africa and the anxieties of 
voters the more English-speaking voters tend to seek solidarity 
with Afrikaans whites in the National Party. The more reform 
oriented the National Party seems to appear, and the greater the 
pressure on it from the right, the more English-speakers are 
inclined to rally to its support. ^
ENGLISH-SPEAKING OPPOSITION VIEWS
Over the past three years, however, nearly one half of 
the English-speaking voters (45 percent plus) have moved behind the 
Progressive Federal Party. This party then represents the 
largest single collectivity of English-speaking voters. The attitudes 
of these voters reflect an interesting mixture of views but together 
this collectivity is the most forward-looking influence of significant 
size in white South African politics. It has become the English 
political "establishment".
Government supporting media often suggest that the typical 
PFP supporter is a convinced "liberal". During political campaigns 
they may even be stereotyped as "leftists", as we see in the 
current referendum campaign. On average, by West European 
standards, however, they are probably middle of the road conservatives.
The most recent nation-wide political poll by the Centre for 
Applied Social Sciences, in co-operation with Market and Opinion Research 
(Pty) Ltd., in May 1982, allows some attitude comparison to be made 
which situates the English-speaking PFP and National Party voters in 
the overall context of white political views in South Africa. In the 
table below, in the interests of brevity, results on attitude items 
are given only for the English party-support groups and Afrikaans supporters 
of the National Party. The NP and the PFP between them have the allegiance
1) For a more detailed analysis of voter support by language see "Data 
Trendline" INDICATOR SA.,Durban, Centre for Applied Social Sciences,
Vol. 1. No. 2, 1983.
of nearly 80 percent of white voters who are committed supporters 
of a political party.
POLITICAL ATTITUDES AMONG ENGLISH-SPEAKING PFP, NRP AND NATIONAL PARTY 
SUPPORTERS COMPARED WITH AFRIKAANS NATIONAL PARTY VOTERS 
(Sample%1990 nation-wide).__________________________________________ __
Proportions willing to accept Percentage Support
°-thnhfUlL ^ - P^ tial c e m e n t  E „  h £ „  h E „  h Afrikaans 
with hypothetical government pFg a Np
initiated reforms* or policy
positions________________________________________________________________
% % % , %
Certain "non-whites" in white 
suburbs 71 55 31 32
Repeal of Immorality Act 77 60 52 40
Opening of all Cinemas and 
Theatres 83 67 59 48
Non-whites attending certain 
white schools 86 62 48 26
Power-sharing with coloureds 
and Indians 92 82 60 62
Power-sharing with all groups 
with safeguards against 
domination 88 75 78 67
South Africa should ignore 
world opinion and follow 
its own course 65 80 92 94
Basic differences exist 
whites and blacks which will 
not change 72 87 91 93
* Items are paraphrased and shortened for presentation.
The results in the table show a considerable degree of 
enlightenment. One has to bear in mind that the statements about 
policy changes were all worded as reforms introduced by the present 
government. The main interest lies in the comparisons between 
groups.
With the exception of one item on power-sharing with all
groups, the results suggest that the English-speaking National Party
supporters are the second-most reform oriented group of significance 
after the English PFP supporters. (Afrikaans PFP supporters are a 
small proportion of some 5-7 percent of Afrikaans voters.) These 
results and many others from the same poll and other studies dispel 
the notion that the English National Party voter is a narrow minded
bigot. This voter is more reform oriented than the typical English
NRP voter or the Afrikaans National Party supporter.
The results on the last two items also suggest that the 
English PFP supporter, while thoroughly convinced about the need for 
reform in race policies, has some very typically conservative basic 
sentiments, like a substantial rejection of world opinion and the 
notion that very basic differences exist between black and white people
Similar evidence of a "white consensus" on basic issues 
of security is provided by Deon Geldenhuysof the Rand Afrikaans 
University in his study of voter attitudes to foreign policy issues.^ 
He found, for example, that 76 percent of English-speaking whites and 
73 percent of PFP supporters agreed that "South Africa should 
militarily attack terrorist bases in its neighbouring states".
1) Deon Geldenhuys, What do we think: A Survey of White Opinion on
Foreign Policy Issues, Johannesburg, South Africa Institute of 
International Affairs, November, 1982.
English-speaking supporters of the PFP and to a considerable 
extent English-speaking National Party supporters as well clearly take 
the clearest and boldest line on race reform among all significant 
voter groups. It is also clear, however, that the typical English- 
speaking voter is not progressive or liberal in all respects. Very 
conservative, indeed parochial sentiments co-exist with progressive 
thinking. English voters, by and large, are by no means consistent 
liberals in their world views. This raises the question of why such 
clear differences in policy attitudes should exist between the majority of 
English and Afrikaans-speaking voters as are reflected in the table 
of attitudes.
THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING VOTER AND PERCEPTIONS OF SURVIVAL
Deon Geldenhuys (referred to earlier) puts forward survey 
evidence which gives a clue to one important factor. He presented 
the subjects in his poll with the statement: "South Africa's blacks 
have good reason to take up arms against the government”. Some 
45 percent of English-speakers agreed, compared with only 14 percent 
of Afrikaners. Seven out of ten PFP supporters supported the view 
in the statement.
Similar results emerged from the poll in 1982 by the Centre 
for Applied Social Sciences. While 37 percent of English-speakers 
felt that blacks were "very dissatisfied" with their conditions, 
only 13 percent of Afrikaners held this view. Nearly 60 percent 
of English PFP supporters saw blacks as very dissatisfied.
One important factor shaping English-speaking policy 
attitudes, then, is a much greater awareness or acceptance of the fact 
that the present order in our society is generating hostility and 
bitterness among blacks. Here the English language press is an 
important factor. The English press has consistently taken pains 
to expose the conditions of blacks. While Afrikaners also read 
the English press, this author's impression is that they are more 
sceptical of the validity of reporting on black conditions than 
English-speaking whites.
The English-speaking white, then, is more likely to seek 
reform as a means of alleviating black hostility and bitterness. 
Reform, for the majority, is perhaps a conservative strategy but 
mixed with genuine concern about the conditions of fellow South 
Africans of a different colour.
THE ENGLISH-SPEAKERS AND.FREEDOM TO REFORM
Over the past 5 years of National Party government under 
Prime Minister P.W. Botha, very similar sentiments have crept into 
National Party rhetoric. Reform is also becoming a strategy for 
survival among Afrikaans nationalists.
There are constraints on Afrikaners which do not exist 
for English-speakers, however. English-speakers do not have a 
self-consciously ethnic tradition. They have a background of 
"metropolitan" culture in which status distinctions and life-style 
differences are well-developed and quite as important as ethnic or 
language differences. Afrikaners, on the other hand, are still 
historically close to what can be called a "folk" tradition 
(volksgemeenskap) which emphasises greater identification and less 
differentiation within the community.
The English-speaking metropolitan tradition with its full 
acceptance of status and class differences allows a formal definition 
of nationhood. Nationality is a legal category which, even though 
it may have strong patriotic meaning, can accommodate social 
differences.
Afrikaners, on the other hand, are still partly affected 
by the notion that a nation should also be a community of identity 
(a volk) with emphasis on similarity and common values. By now 
Afrikaans class differentiation is well-advanced and a metropolitan 
spirit has emerged, but Afrikaans cultural organisations, schools, 
teachers and churches tend implicitly to emphasise the earlier ideal.
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The net result, as it were, tends to be that English- 
speaking whites find it easier to accept the full implications of 
racial reform, social integration of black people, than a substantial 
proportion of Afrikaners. Many Afrikaners are inclined to resist 
perceiving black needs and demands because of unease about the implications 
of a varied and polyglot nation of South Africans. In the results 
of a survey which we conducted in 1974, 65 percent of English saw 
Africans as South Africans compared with only 40 percent among 
Afrikaners. ^
Afrikaners are also more concerned about the survival of 
their language than English-speakers. Quite obviously, nothing 
can displace English as the Lingua Franca in South Africa, but a 
completely open democracy will soon reduce Afrikaans to the status 
of a private minority language, even if it remains nominally one of 
the official languages.
A ROLE FOR ENGLISH-SPEAKING WHITE LEADERS
Peaceful change, greater social justice and steady reform 
in race policies are undoubtedly the best strategies which English- 
speaking whites can adopt in seeking to preserve their material well- 
being and style of living. This political viewpoint is widely- 
shared among them and draws together most of the otherwise politically 
disparate social types listed in the beginning of this essay. It is 
even a view which in considerable measure unites the views of 
government and opposition-supporting English-speakers. At a time of 
great political disunity among Afrikaners, it is the English who seem 
to enjoy the greatest commonality of views among whites.
English-speakers are also well-placed, it seems, to be 
informed about and to be open to the serious political alienation 
which current policies have created for black people.
« I) L. Schlemmer, "English-speaking South Africans Today: Identity
and Integration into the Broader National Community", in Andre 
de Villiers (Ed) English-Speaking South Africa Today, Cape Town, 
» Oxford University Press, 1976.
Indeed, the English strategy of survival demands that they pay full 
attention to the conditions and problems of black people, despite some 
very basic anti-liberal views.
Furthermore, by now Afrikaners are beginning to trust the 
English-speakers. Over nearly two decades of party politics 
the English floating voter has moved in to support the government 
when it has been under pressure, and they will do so again. English 
commitment to basic national security is not likely to be questioned 
any longer by Afrikaners.
All these factors place the English-speaking leader in a 
very favourable position to play the role of honest broker between 
the government and blacks in regard to urgently-needed reforms. 
Organisations like the Urban Foundation have already taken up this 
role. More English-speaking leaders might perhaps consider this 
challenge. The relatively new but strengthening links between 
English and Afrikaans in the business world can facilitate the 
communication which is necessary.
As I have implied above, English-speakers are perhaps the 
group which is most "liberated" from traditional anxieties and from 
socio-economic disadvantage. This liberty,while it brings with it 
a great degree of political rationality, can create some insensitivity to 
political needs and feelings among both black people and Afrikaners.
If the role I have suggested is to be played successfully it will 
require more than the lip-service of liberal rhetoric and moral injunction.
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